A sabre for a soldier on horse-back certainly adds to his martial appearance. The same weapon attached to a soldier marching, or rather trudging along, by the side of his piece on the march adds nothing to his martial appearance and the evident uselessness of his weapon makes him appear ridiculous.

When volunteer batteries came into service they, to, adopted the sabre; but as campaigning progressed this weapon was cast aside by both volunteers and regulars, except…when it was retained for the use of non-commissioned officers. A very little active field service proved it to be entirely useless as a weapon, and while being thus useless it was so cumbersome as to greatly interfere with the performance of duty required of artillery soldiers. So thoroughly was it superfluous that no attempt was made to improve it, either in weight or model. With such qualities it soon became relegated to disuse; not, however, by any form of official order but by simple disappearance. On the march it soon found its way, with the other trash of its kind, to the caissons or carriages of the piece, where broken and rusty it was carried…until such time as it could be brought before a duly authorised Inspector  for formal condemnation, to be dropped from the property of the battery, or, more frequently eliminated from the returns by the remark  ‘lost in action.’

The sabres retained for non-commissioned officers were used more as badges of authority than as veritable weapons. Non-commissioned officers not thus armed were supplied with revolvers, certainly a very great improvement to the sabre.

The first battery to be equipped as horse artillery discarded entirely the sabre and adopted the revolver for all the men. Other batteries, following as horse artillery, adopted the same custom. But it was soon discovered that revolvers were of no practical use for men of a battery, even horse artillery, and in a little while they too fell out of use, except for non-commissioned officers, who still retained them as badges of authority rather than for actual use as weapons.

The revolver while not so objectionable as the sabre is still an encumbrance to the soldier; is more difficult to keep in serviceable condition; is liable to theft and loss from many causes; and being without practical use is quite superfluous as an article of equipment.

It is…sometimes supposed that batteries require arms for the use of their camp guard. Nothing is more fallacious. A driver’s whip  in the hands of the sentinel at the picket line is far better in preserving order among the horses than a sabre or a revolver, and as to sentinels over the battery park, their functions, as mere watchmen, are performed quite as well without arms. To the eye of the amateur soldier these suggestions may seem highly unmilitary; but it must be remembered that in time of war all that is not actually useful should be discarded.

While hand weapons of any kind are useless, even worse than useless, for men of a battery on campaign, it may be conceded that for certain garrison purposes they are admissible…The cavalry carbine…suggests  itself as a suitable arm to be issued to the men of a battery for garrison purposes; never, however, as an arm to be taken to the field for campaigning. A broad distinction must be made between garrison and field service.

The fundamental idea suggesting that the men of field batteries be individually armed arises from the suggestion that the battery may be caught  without the protecting support  of the other arms of the service and thus fall prey to the enemy. All of which might possibly occur with a carelessly conducted expedition, or even an army corps marching in the country of the enemy without ordinary precautions. But  where  such conditions exist  no amount  of personal  armament will suffice to correct the evil. When batteries fall under incompetent commanders whether of army corps or of small expeditions they must take their  chances and  that is all that can be said about it.

Batteries do not operate  in the field without the support of other troops about them. In a general sense all troops about them,  whether a single battalion or an army corps, became their supports, and reciprocally, they are supports to such troops. They each do their own share of the battle with their own specific arms, using them in such a manner as to be most effective.

When their supports are hard pressed by the enemy, then is the time for batteries to put in their greatest efforts, not however by resorting to the use of hand weapons, always of little value at such times, but by standing to their guns with strenuous energy. In the words of General Taylor at Buena Vista,  ‘A little more grape  Captain Bragg,’ is the kind of assistance more likely to be effective.

In spite of everything to the contrary, batteries will sometimes be lost in battle, even by the victorious party. But to attempt to prevent it by resorting to puerile methods, such as the use of sabres or revolvers, is to tempt providence.

Note: When Tidball refers to the ‘the first battery equipped as horse artillery,’ he is refering to his own, Company A.

During September 1861 the battery ‘Went into camp at Washington,’ wrote Tidball, ‘and mounted as a horse battery with six guns…’

‘Battery A, was the first battery on this continent to be mounted as Horse Artillery. Ringgold, who commanded Battery C of the 3rd Artillery, used, upon occasion to equip one of the sections (Platoons) of his battery as Horse Artilley, but the battery was not a Horse Artillery battery, and never used as such.

‘When Ringgold mounted his battery in 1838 it was new thing in our service, and was called Horse Artillery, because it had horses. This confusion of terms, continued until after the commencement of the Rebellion. Gen. Scott reported to the President, that in the spring of 1861, that another Horse Battery had arrived at Washington, meaning, of course, a mounted (or Light) battery. This confusion of terms misled Birkhimer in his admirable History of the U.S. Artillery. But the honor of having the first Horse Artillery Battery belongs to the Second Regiment. At the time of mounting Battery A, I made a special inquiry as to the fact and knew it to be so.’

While Butterfield lay on his sick-bed he fell prey to melancholy. Every night he listened to Taps, blown as prescribed in Casey’s manual. He thought the call ‘did not seem to be as smooth, melodious and musical as it should be.’ After much consideration he called in someone who could write music and, he later remembered, ‘practised a change in the call of Taps until I had it to suit my ear.’ He then sent for his Headquarters’ Bugler, Oliver W. Norton. He showed Norton some notes, ‘written in pencil on the back of an envelope’ and asked him to sound them on his bugle. The musician did so several times, playing the notes as written. Butterfield then ‘changed it somewhat, lengthening some notes and shortening others, but retaining the melody.’ Satisfied with the new version the General ordered the Bugler to sound it for Taps, in place of the regulation call.

Norton always remembered the first night he officially played Butterfield’s Taps. ‘The music was beautiful on that still summer night, and was heard beyond the limits of our Brigade.’ The next day he was inundated with requests from fellow buglers for copies of the music. There was no general order issued to authorise the new Taps, but each unit commander used his own discretion to adopt it; and it was gradually taken up by the whole of the Army of the Potomac.

At about 12.30 a.m. on August 1st the Confederates brought a few light batteries to Coggin’s Point and the Cole’s House, on the right bank of the James River, directly opposite Harrison’s Landing; opening a heavy fire on the Union shipping and encampments. It was continued rapidly for half an hour, until the Rebel’s guns were driven back by the fire of the Union batteries. ‘No harm of the slightest consequence [was] done to the shipping, although several were struck,’ wrote Gen. McClellan. However, the fire directed toward the Army’s encampment had more devastating effect. Total Union causalities were 10 men dead and 15 wounded. 

The next day McClellan sent a party across the river to destroy the Cole’s House, and cut down the timber that had helped to mask the Rebel batteries.

Battery A, Second U. S. Artillery had one man killed and two wounded during the Confederate attach. The fatality suffered by the company was a corporal, and according to his commander, John Tidball, ‘a most excellent man and soldier.’

‘I was desirous of burying him with full military honors. I was, however, refused permission to fire three guns over his grave, and the thought suggested itself to me to sound Taps instead, which I did. The idea was taken up by others and soon became the custom.’

As John H. Calef , (another officer that served with company A) noted many years later,‘[This] impressive custom has since been observed at all military funerals, at the conclusion of the [burial] ceremony.’

It has always been assumed that the version of Taps played over the grave of the dead corporal was Butterfield’s. But, due to the close proximity of the date of composition and the funeral, this is by no means certain. The first time Taps was used in an American military funeral, it may have been the version found in Casey’s manual. What is without doubt is that Battery A was the first military unit to “just play Taps,” as ordered by its commander, John Tidball.
 

N.B. As the date of the artilleryman’s death, his rank and his military unit are known; it should be possible to discover his name, and perhaps his service history. If anyone is willing and able to look into this for me at the National Archives in Washington D.C. please contact me.

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